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Abstract In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for controlled-
diffusion processes, with dynamic risk measures, in which multiple risk-averse agents
choose their decisions in such a way to minimize their individual accumulated risk-
costs over a finite-time horizon. In particular, we introduce multi-structure dynamic
risk measures induced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associ-
ated with the generator functionals of certain BSDEs that implicitly take into account
the risk-cost functionals of the risk-averse agents. Here, we also require that such so-
lutions of the BSDEs to satisfy a stochastic viability property with respect to a given
closed convex set. Moreover, using a result similar to that of the Arrow-Barankin-
Blackwell theorem, we establish the existence of consistent optimal decisions for the
risk-averse agents, when the set of all Pareto optimal solutions, in the sense of viscos-
ity, for the associated dynamic programming equations is dense in the given closed
convex set. Finally, we briefly comment on the characteristics of acceptable risks vis-
a´-vis some uncertain future costs or outcomes, in which results from the dynamic risk
analysis constitute part of the information used in the risk-averse decision criteria.
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1 Introduction
During the past decades, since the early work of Borch [6], there have been studies
clarifying appropriate solution concepts, such as equilibrium solutions, in connection
with optimal risk allocations and risk aversions that are almost exclusively in the con-
text of mathematical economics and insurance (e.g., see [4], [7], [8], [11], [12], [17]
and [18, pp. 88-96] and the references therein). On the other hand, since the sem-
inal work of Artzner et al. [3], some interesting studies on characterizing axiomatic
concepts such as dynamic risk measures, coherency, consistency and convexity have
been reported in the literature (e.g., see [13], [26], [29], [16] or [9] and the refer-
ences therein). More importantly, we observe that the contributions of these studies
at least focused on three interrelated questions: (i) the first one is a conceptual or
purely modeling question that deals with, for example, how should solution concepts
– such as equilibrium solutions in the context of optimal risk allocations and risk
aversions – be defined given new decision theoretic foundations; (ii) the second one
is a general question on the behavioral implication – associated with the consistency
and coherency of “rational” decisions – of such newly introduced solution concepts;
and (iii) the last one is an insight question – where such solution concepts or the asso-
ciated innovative results might bring to applied contexts in mathematical economics,
finance, engineering and elsewhere.
In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for controlled-diffusion pro-
cesses, with dynamic risk measures, in which multiple risk-averse agents choose their
decisions in such a way to minimize their individual accumulated risk-costs over a
finite-time horizon. We specifically introduce multi-structure dynamic risk measures
induced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associated with the gen-
erator functionals of certain BSDEs that implicitly take into account the risk-cost
functionals of the risk-averse agents. Here, we also require that such solutions of the
BSDEs to satisfy a stochastic viability property with respect to a given closed convex
set. Further, using a result similar to the Arrow-Barankin-Blackwell theorem, we es-
tablish the existence of consistent optimal decisions for the risk-averse agents, when
the set of all Pareto optimal solutions, in the sense of viscosity, for the associated
dynamic programming equations is dense in the given closed convex set. Moreover,
for such a risk-averse decision problem, where results from the dynamic risk analysis
are part of the information used in the risk-averse decision criteria, we briefly com-
ment on the characteristics of acceptable risks vis-a´-vis some uncertain future costs
or outcomes.
Here, it is worth mentioning that some interesting studies on the dynamic risk mea-
sures, based on the conditional g-expecations, have been reported in the literature
(e,g. see [26], [9] and [29] for establishing connection between the risk measures and
the generator of BSDE; and see also [31] for characterizing the generator of BSDE
according to different risk measures). Moreover, such risk measures are widely used
for evaluating the risk of uncertain future outcomes, and also assisting with stipulat-
ing minimum interventions for risk management (e.g., see [3], [26], [14], [16], [13]
or [9] for related discussions). Recently, the authors in [30] and [5] have provided in-
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teresting results on the risk-averse decision problem for Markov decision processes,
in discrete-time setting, and, respectively, a hierarchical risk-averse framework for
controlled-diffusion processes. Note that the rationale behind our framework follows
in some sense the settings of these papers. However, to our knowledge, the problem
of risk-aversion for controlled-diffusion processes has not been addressed in the con-
text of multiple risk-averse agents argument, and it is important because it provides
a mathematical framework that shows how a such framework can be systematically
used to obtain consistently optimal risk-averse decisions.1
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present some
preliminary results that are useful for our main results. In Section 3, using the basic
remarks made in Section 2, we state the decision problem for the controlled-diffusion
process with multiple risk-averse agents. In Section 4, we present our main results –
where we introduce a framework that requires a “rational” cooperation among the
risk-averse agents so as to achieve an overall optimal risk-averseness. Moreover, we
establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions for the associated risk-averse
dynamic programming equations. Finally, Section 5 provides further remarks.
2 Preliminary results
Let
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P
)
be a probability space, and let {Bt}t≥0 be a d-dimensional
standard Brownian motion, whose natural filtration, augmented by all P-null sets,
is denoted by {Ft}t≥0, so that it satisfies the usual hypotheses (e.g., see [27]). We
consider the following controlled-diffusion process over a given finite-time horizon
T > 0
dXu·t = m
(
t,Xu·t , (u
1
t , u
2
t , · · · , u
n
t )
)
dt+σ
(
t,Xu·t , (u
1
t , u
2
t , · · · , u
n
t )
)
dBt,
Xu·0 = x, 0 ≤ t ≤ T, (1)
where
– Xu·· is an Rd-valued controlled-diffusion process,
– uj· is a U j-valued measurable decision processes, which corresponds to the jth
risk-averse agent (whereU j is an open compact set in Rmj , with j = 1, 2, . . . , n);
and, furthermore, u· , (u1· , u2· , · · · , un· ) is an n-tuple of
∏n
i=1 U
i
-valued mea-
surable decision processes such that for all t > s, (Bt−Bs) is independent of ur
for r ≤ s (nonanticipativity condition) and
E
∫ t
s
|uτ |
2dτ <∞ ∀t ≥ s,
– m : [0, T ] × Rd ×
∏n
i=1 U
i → Rd is uniformly Lipschitz, with bounded first
derivative, and
1 In this paper, our intent is to provide a theoretical framework, rather than considering a specific nu-
merical problem or application.
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– σ : [0, T ]×Rd×
∏n
i=1 U
i → Rd×d is Lipschitz with the least eigenvalue of σ σT
uniformly bounded away from zero for all (x, u) ∈ Rd×
∏n
i=1 U
i and t ∈ [0, T ],
i.e.,
σ(t, x, u)σT (t, x, u)  λId×d, ∀(x, u) ∈ R
d ×
∏n
i=1
U i,
∀t ∈ [0, T ],
for some λ > 0.
Notation: Let us introduce the following spaces that will be useful later in the pa-
per.
– L2
(
Ω,Ft,P;R
d
)
is the set of Rd-valuedFt-measurable random variables ξ such
that
∥∥ξ∥∥2 = E{∣∣ξ∣∣2} <∞;
– L∞
(
Ω,Ft,P
)
is the set of R-valuedFt-measurable random variables ξ such that∥∥ξ∥∥ = ess inf∣∣ξ∣∣ <∞;
– S2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
is the set of Rd-valued adapted processes
(
ϕs
)
t≤s≤T
on Ω × [t, T ]
such that
∥∥ϕ∥∥2
[t,T ]
= E
{
supt≤s≤T
∣∣ϕs∣∣2} <∞;
– H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
is the set ofRd-valued progressively measurable processes
(
ϕs
)
t≤s≤T
such that
∥∥ϕ∥∥2
[t,T ]
= E
{∫ T
t
∣∣ϕs∣∣2ds} <∞.
On the same probability space
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P
)
, we consider the following back-
ward stochastic differential equation (BSDE)
−dYt = g
(
t, Yt, Zt
)
dt− ZtdBt, YT = ξ, (2)
where the terminal value YT = ξ belongs to L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
and the generator
functional g : Ω × [0, T ] × R × Rd → R, with property that
(
g
(
t, y, z
))
0≤t≤T
is
progressively measurable for each (y, z) ∈ R × Rd. We also assume that g satisfies
the following assumption.
Assumption 1
(i) g is Lipschitz in (y, z), i.e., there exists a constant K > 0 such that, P-a.s., for
any t ∈ [0, T ], y1, y2 ∈ R and z1, z2 ∈ Rd∣∣g(t, y1, z1)− g(t, y2, z2)∣∣ ≤ K(∣∣y1 − y2∣∣+ ∥∥z1 − z2∥∥).
(ii) g(t, 0, 0) ∈ H2(t, T ;R).
(iii) P-a.s., for all t ∈ [0, T ] and y ∈ R, g(t, y, 0) = 0.
Then, we state the following lemma, which is used to establish the existence of a
unique adapted solution (e.g., see [22] for additional discussions).
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Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds true. Then, for any ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R),
the BSDE in (2), with terminal condition YT = ξ, i.e.,
Yt = ξ +
∫ T
t
g
(
s, Ys, Zs
)
ds−
∫ T
t
ZsdBs, 0 ≤ t ≤ T (3)
has a unique adapted solution(
Y T,g,ξt , Z
T,g,ξ
t
)
0≤t≤T
∈ S2
(
0, T ;R
)
×H2
(
0, T ;Rd
)
. (4)
Moreover, we recall the following comparison theorem, which is restricted to one-
dimensional BSDEs (e.g., see [23]).
Theorem 1 Given two generators g1 and g2 satisfying Assumption 1 and two termi-
nal conditions ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
. Let
(
Y 1t , Z
1
t
)
and
(
Y 2t , Z
2
t
)
be the solution
pairs corresponding to
(
ξ1, g1
)
and
(
ξ2, g2
)
, respectively. Then, we have
(i) Monotonicity: If ξ1 > ξ2 and g1 > g2, P-a.s., then Y 1t > Y 2t , P-a.s., for all
t ∈ [0, T ];
(ii) Strictly Monotonicity: In addition to (i) above, if we assume that P(ξ1 > ξ2) >
0, then P
(
Y 1t > Y
2
t
)
> 0, for all t ∈ [0, T ].
In the following, we give the definition for a dynamic risk measure that is associated
with the generator of BSDE in (2).
Definition 1 For any ξ ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
, let
(
Y T,g,ξt , Z
T,g,ξ
t
)
0≤t≤T
∈ S2
(
0, T ;R
)
×
H2
(
0, T ;Rd
)
be the unique solution for the BSDE in (2) with terminal condition
YT = ξ. Then, we define the dynamic risk measure ρgt,T of ξ by2
ρgt,T
[
ξ
]
, Y T,g,ξt . (5)
Moreover, if the generator functional g satisfies Assumption 1, then a family of time-
consistent dynamic risk measures
{
ρgt,T
}
t∈[0,T ]
has the following properties (see [26]
for additional discussions).
Property 1
(i) Convexity: If g is convex for every fixed (t, ω) ∈ [0, T ]×Ω, then for all ξ1, ξ2 ∈
L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
and for all λ ∈ L∞
(
Ω,Ft,P;R
)
such that 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1
ρgt,T
[
λξ1 + (1− λ)ξ2
]
≤ λρgt,T
[
ξ1
]
+ (1− λ)ρgt,T
[
ξ1
]
;
2 Here, we remark that, for any t ∈ [0, T ], the conditional g-expectation (denoted by Eg
[
ξ|Ft
]) is also
defined by
Eg
[
ξ|Ft
]
, Y
T,g,ξ
t .
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(ii) Monotonicity: For ξ1, ξ2 ∈ L2
(
Ω,FT ,P;R
)
such that ξ1 > ξ2 P-a.s., then
ρgt,T
[
ξ1
]
> ρgt,T
[
ξ2
]
, P-a.s.;
(iii) Trans-invariance: For all ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R) and ν ∈ L2(Ω,Ft,P;R)
ρgt,T
[
ξ + ν
]
= ρgt,T
[
ξ
]
+ ν;
(iv) Positive-homogeneity: For all ξ ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R) and for all λ ∈ L∞(Ω,Ft,P;R)
such that λ > 0
ρgt,T
[
λξ
]
= λρgt,T
[
ξ
]
;
(v) Normalization: ρgt,T
[
0
]
= 0 for t ∈ [0, T ].
Remark 1 In Section 3, using the basic remarks made in this section, we introduce
multi-structure dynamic risk measures (that satisfy the above properties (i)–(v)) in-
duced from conditional g-expectations, where the latter are associated with the gen-
erator functionals of certain BSDEs that implicitly take into account the risk-cost
functionals of the risk-averse agents.
In this paper, we consider a risk-averse decision problem for the above controlled-
diffusion process, in which the decision makers (i.e., the n risk-averse agents with
differing risk-averse related responsibilities and information) choose their risk-averse
decisions from progressively measurable strategy sets. That is, the jth-agent’s deci-
sion uj· is a U j-valued measurable control process from
Uj[0,T ] ,
{
uj : [0, T ]×Ω → U j
∣∣∣ uj is an {Ft}t≥0- adapted
and E
∫ T
0
|ujt |
2dt <∞
}
, j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (6)
Moreover, we suppose that the risk-averse agents are “rational” (in the sense of
making consistent decisions that minimize their individual accumulated risk-costs)
with a certain n-tuple of measurable decision processes uˆ = ( uˆ1· , uˆ2· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈⊗n
i=1 U
i
[0,T ]. Further, we consider the following cost functionals providing informa-
tion about the accumulated risk-costs on the time interval [0, T ] w.r.t. each of the
risk-averse agents, i.e.,
ξj0,T (u
¬j) =
∫ T
0
cj
(
t,X
u¬j
·
t , u
j
t
)
dt+ Ψj(X
u¬j
·
T ), j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (7)
where
u¬j· , ( uˆ
1
· , · · · , uˆ
j−1
· , u
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1
U i[0,T ],
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with cj : [0, T ]×Rd×U j → R and Ψj : Rd → R are measurable functions. Here, we
remark that the corresponding solution Xu
¬j
·
t , for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, in equation (1)
depends on the n-tuple admissible risk-averse decisions u¬j· ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[0,T ] and it
also depends on the initial condition Xu
¬j
·
0 = x. As a result of this, for any time-
interval [t, T ], with t ∈ [0, T ], the accumulated risk-costs ξjt,T , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
depend on the risk-averse decisions u¬j· ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ].
3 Moreover, we also assume
that f , σ, cj and Ψj , for p ≥ 1, satisfy the following growth conditions∣∣m(t, x, u)∣∣+ ∣∣σ(t, x, u)∣∣+ ∣∣cj(t, x, u)∣∣+ ∣∣Ψj(x)∣∣
≤ K
(
1 +
∣∣x∣∣p + ∣∣u∣∣), ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, (8)
for all
(
t, x, u
)
∈ [0, T ]× Rd ×
∏n
i=1 U
i and for some constant K > 0.
3 Risk-averse decision problem formulation
In order to make our problem formulation more precise, for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd,
we consider the following forward-SDE with an initial condition Xt,x;u
¬j
·
t = x, for
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
dX
t,x;u¬j
·
s = m
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s , ( uˆ1s, · · · , uˆ
j−1
s , u
j
s, uˆ
j+1
s , · · · , uˆ
n
s )
)
dt
+ σ
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s , ( uˆ1s, · · · , uˆ
j−1
s , u
j
s, uˆ
j+1
s , · · · , uˆ
n
s )
)
dBt,
X
t,x;u¬j
·
t = x, t ≤ s ≤ T, (9)
where u¬j· = ( uˆ1s, · · · , uˆj−1s , ujs, uˆj+1s , · · · , uˆns ) is an n-tuple of
∏n
i=1 U
j
-valued
measurable decision processes.
Let
{
ξTargetj
}n
j=1
be a set of real-valued random variables fromL2(Ω,FT ,P;R) and
we further suppose that the data ξTargetj take the following forms
ξTargetj = Ψj(X
t,x;u¬j
·
T ), j = 1, 2, . . . , n, P− a.s. (10)
Moreover, we introduce the following risk-value functions
V u
j
j
(
t, x
)
= ρ
gj
t,T
[
ξjt,T
(
u¬j
)]
, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (11)
where
ξjt,T
(
u¬j
)
=
∫ T
t
cj
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s , u
j
s
)
ds+ Ψj(X
t,x;u¬j
·
T ). (12)
3 Here, we use the notation u¬j to emphasize the dependence on uj· ∈ Uj[t,T ], where U
j
[t,T ]
, for any
t ∈ [0, T ], denotes the sets of Uj-valued
{
Fts
}
s≥t
-adapted processes (see Definition 2).
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Then, taking into account equation (10) (and with the Markovian framework), we can
express the above risk-value functions using standard-BSDEs as follows
V u
j
j
(
t, x
)
, Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s
= Ψj(X
t,x;u¬j
·
T ) +
∫ T
t
gj
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s , Z
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s
)
ds
−
∫ T
t
Z
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s dBs, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, (13)
where
gj
(
t,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s , Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s , Z
j,t,x;w
s
)
= cj
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s , u
j
s
)
+ g
(
s, Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s , Z
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s
)
.
and further noting the conditions in (8), then the pairs (Y j,t,x;u¬j·s , Zj,t,x;u¬j·s )t≤s≤T
are adapted solutions on [t, T ]×Ω and belong to S2
(
t, T ;R
)
×H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
. Equiv-
alently, we can also rewrite (13) as a family of BSDEs on the probability space(
Ω,F ,P, {Ft}t≥0), i.e., for s ∈ [t, T ],
−dY
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s = gj
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s , Z
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s
)
ds− Z
j,t,x;u¬j
·
s dBs,
Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
T = Ψj(X
t,x;u¬j
·
T ), j = 1, 2, . . . , n. (14)
In the following, we denote the solutions
(
Y
1,t,x;u¬1
·
s , Y
2,t,x;u¬2
·
s , · · · , Y
n,t,x;u¬n
·
s
)
∈⊗n
i=1 S
2
(
t, T ;R
)
and
(
Z
1,t,x;u¬1
·
s , Z
2,t,x;u¬2
·
s , · · · , Z
n,t,x;u¬n
·
s
)
∈
⊗n
i=1H
2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
by bold letters Yt,x;us and Zt,x;us , respectively, for any t ∈ [0, T ] and for s ∈ [t, T ].
Similarly, the family of BSDEs in (14) can be rewritten as a multi-dimensional BSDE
as follows
−dYt,x;us = G
(
s,Xt,x;us Y
t,x;u
s ,Z
t,x;u
s
)
ds− Zt,x;us dBs,
s ∈ [t, T ], Yt,x;uT = Ψ(X
t,x;u
T ), (15)
where
G
(
s,Xt,x;us Y
t,x;u
s ,Z
t,x;u
s
)
= block diag
{
g1
(
s,X
t,x;u¬1
·
s Y
1,t,x;u¬1
·
s , Z
1,t,x;u¬1
·
s
)
,
g2
(
s,X
t,x;u¬2
·
s Y
2,t,x;u¬2
·
s , Z
2,t,x;u¬2
·
s ), · · · , gn
(
s,X
t,x;u¬n
·
s Y
n,t,x;u¬n
·
s , Z
n,t,x;u¬n
·
s
))}
and
Ψ(Xt,x;uT ) =
(
Ψ1(X
t,x;u¬1
·
T ), Ψ2(X
t,x;u¬2
·
T ), · · · , Ψn(X
t,x;u¬n
·
T )
)
.
Let K be a closed convex set in Rn, then we recall the notion of viability property
for the BSDE in (15) (cf. equations (13) and (14)).
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Definition 2 Let uˆ· = ( uˆ1· , uˆ2· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ] be an n-tuple of “rational”
preferable decisions for the risk-averse agents. Then, for a nonempty closed convex
set K ⊂ Rn and for uj· ∈ Uj[0,T ], with j = 1, 2, . . . , n
(a) A stochastic process {Y0,x;ut , t ∈ [0, T ]} is viable in K if and only if for P-
almost ω ∈ Ω
Y
0,x;u
t (ω) ∈ K, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]. (16)
(b) The closed convex set K enjoys the Backward Stochastic Viability Property
(BSVP) for the equation in (15) if and only if for all τ ∈ [0, T ], with equa-
tion (10), i.e.,
∀ΞTarget =
(
ξTarget1 , ξ
Target
2 , · · · , ξ
Target
n
)
∈ L2
(
Ω,Fτ ,P;R
n
)
, (17)
there exists a solution pair
(
Y
0,x;u
· ,Z
0,x;u
·
)
to the BSDE in (15) over the time
interval [0, τ ],
Y
0,x;u
s = Ξ
Target +
∫ τ
s
G
(
r,X0,x;ur Y
0,x;u
r ,Z
0,x;u
r
)
dr −
∫ τ
s
Z
0,x;u
r dBr,
(18)
with (
Y
0,x;u
· ,Z
0,x;u
·
)
∈
⊗n
i=1
S2
(
0, τ ;R
)
×
⊗n
i=1
H2
(
0, τ ;Rd
)
,
such that
{
Y
0,x;u
s , s ∈ [0, τ ]
}
is viable in K .
For the above given closed convex setK , let us define the projection of a point a onto
K as follow
ΠK(a) =
{
b ∈ K
∣∣ |a− b| = min
c∈K
|a− c| = dK(a)
}
. (19)
Notice that, since K is convex, from the Motzkin’s theorem, ΠK is single-valued.
Further, we recall that d2K(·) is convex; and thus, due to Alexandrov’s theorem [1],
d2K(·) is almost everywhere twice differentiable.
Assume that there exists an n-tuple of “rational” decisions uˆ = ( uˆ1· , uˆ2· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈⊗n
i=1 U
i
[0,T ] which is preferable by all risk-averse decision-making agents. Moreover,
on the space C1,2b ([t, T ] × Rd);Rn), for any (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd, we consider the
following system of semilinear parabolic partial differential equations (PDEs)
∂ϕj(t, x)
∂t
+ infuj∈Uj
{
Lu
¬j
t ϕj(t, x)
+gj
(
t, ϕ(t, x), Dxϕj(t, x) · σ(t, x, u
¬j)
)}
= 0
j = 1, 2, . . . , n

 (20)
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with the following boundary condition
ϕ(T, x) = Ψ(x),
≡
(
Ψ1(x), Ψ2(x), · · · , Ψn(x)
)
, x ∈ Rd, (21)
where, for any φ(x) ∈ C∞0 (Rd), the second-order linear operators Lu
¬j
t are given
by
Lu
¬j
t φ(x) =
1
2
tr
{
a(t, x, u¬j)D2xφ(x)
}
+m(t, x, u¬j)Dxφ(x),
t ∈ [0, T ], j = 1, 2, . . . n, (22)
with a(t, x, u¬j) = σ(t, x, u¬j)σT (t, x, u¬j),Dx andD2x, (withD2x =
(
∂2/∂xk∂xl
))
are the gradient and the Hessian (w.r.t. the variable x), respectively.
Remark 2 Here, we remark that the above system of equations in (20) together with
(21), is associated with the decision problem for the risk-averse agents, restricted to
Σ[t,T ] (see Definition 2 below). Moreover, such a system of equations represents a
generalized family of HJB equation with additional terms gj for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Note
that the problem of FBSDEs (cf. equations (9) and (15) or (14)) and the solvability of
the related system of semilinear parabolic PDEs have been well studied in literature
(e.g., see [2], [19], [21], [23], [24] and [25]).
Next, we recall the definition of viscosity solutions for (20) along with (21) (e.g.,
see [10], [15] or [20] for additional discussions on the notion of viscosity solu-
tions).
Definition 3 The function ϕ : [0, T ] × Rd → Rn is a viscosity solution for (20)
together with the boundary condition in (21), if the following conditions hold
(i) for every ψ ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ],×Rd;Rn) such that ψ ≥ ϕ on [0, T ]× Rd,
sup
(t,x)
{
ϕ(t, x)− ψ(t, x)
}
= 0, (23)
and for (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd such that ψ(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0) (i.e., a local
maximum at (t0, x0)), then we have
∂ψj(t0, x0)
∂t
+ inf
uj∈Uj
{
Lu
¬j
t ψj(t0, x0)
+ gj
(
t0, x0, ψ(t0, x0), Dxψj(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, u
¬j)
)}
≥ 0 (24)
(ii) for every ψ ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ],×Rd;Rn) such that ψ ≤ ϕ on [0, T ]× Rd,
inf
(t,x)
{
ϕ(t, x)− ψ(t, x)
}
= 0, (25)
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and for (t0, x0) ∈ [0, T ] × Rd such that ψ(t0, x0) = ϕ(t0, x0) (i.e., a local
minimum at (t0, x0)), then we have
∂ψj(t0, x0)
∂t
+ inf
uj∈Uj
{
Lu
¬j
t ψj(t0, x0)
+ gj
(
t0, x0, ψ(t0, x0), Dxψj(t0, x0) · σ(t0, x0, u
¬j)
)}
≤ 0, (26)
for j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Next, let us define the viability property for the system of semilinear parabolic PDEs
in (20) as follow.
Definition 4 The system of semilinear parabolic PDEs in (20) enjoys the viability
property w.r.t. the closed convex set K if and only if, for any Ψ ∈ Cp(Rd;Rn)
taking values in K , the viscosity solution to (20) satisfies
∀(t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd, ϕ(t, x) ∈ K. (27)
Later in Section 4, assuming the Markovian framework, we provide additional results
that establish a connection between the viability property of the BSDE in (15), w.r.t.
the closed convex set K , and the solutions, in the sense viscosity, for the system of
semilinear parabolic PDEs in (20).
In what follows, we introduce a framework that requires a “rational” cooperation
among the risk-averse agents so as to achieve an overall risk-averseness (in the sense
of Pareto optimality). For example, for any t ∈ [0, T ], let us assume that
uˆ· = ( uˆ
1
· , uˆ
2
· , · · · , uˆ
n
· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1
U i[t,T ]
is an n-tuple of “rational” preferable decisions for the risk-averse agents, then the
problem of finding an optimal risk-averse decision for the jth-agent, where j ∈
{1, 2, . . . , n}, that minimizes the jth-accumulated risk-cost functional, is equivalent
to finding an optimal solution for
inf
u
j
·
∈U
j
[t,T ]
Jj
[(
u¬j)
]
, (28)
where
Jj
[(
u¬j
)]
= ρ
gj
t,T
[
ξjt,T
(
u¬j
)]
, (29)
with u¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , u
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ].
Remark 3 Here, we remark that the generator functionals gj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n,
contain a common term g that acts on different processes (see equations (13) and
(14)). Moreover, due to differing risk-cost functionals w.r.t. each of the agents, we
also observe that
{
ρ
gj
t,T
[
· ]
}n
j=1
, for t ∈ [0, T ], in equation (29) provide multi-structure,
time-consistent, dynamic risk measures vis-a´-vis some uncertain future outcomes
specified by a set of random variables from L2(Ω,FT ,P;R).
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Note that, for any given uj· ∈ Uj[t,T ], if the forward-backward stochastic differential
equations (FBSDEs) in (9) and (15) (cf. equations (13) and (14)) admit unique so-
lutions and, further, Yt,x;us (ω) ∈ K , for P-almost ω ∈ Ω and for all s ∈ [t, T ] and
for t ∈ [0, T ]. Then, any “rational” preferable decisions for the jth-agent satisfy the
following
uˆj· ∈
{
u˜· ∈ U
j
[t,T ]
∣∣∣ ρgjt,T [ξjt,T (u˜¬j)]≤ ρgjt,T [ξjt,T (u¬j)],
∀( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆ
n
· ) ∈
⊗
i6=j
U i[t,T ],
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, P− a.s.
}
, (30)
where u˜¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , u˜
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ].
4
Next, we introduce the following definition for an admissible risk-averse decision
system Σ[t,T ], with multi-structure dynamic risk measures, which provides a logical
construct for our main results (e.g., see also [21]).
Definition 5 For a given finite-time horizon T > 0, we call Σ[t,T ] an admissible
risk-averse decision system, if it satisfies the following conditions:
–
(
Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0,P
)
is a complete probability space;
–
{
Bs
}
s≥t
is a d-dimensional standard Brownian motion defined on
(
Ω,F ,P
)
over [t, T ] and F t ,
{
F ts
}
s∈[t,T ]
, where F ts = σ
{(
Bs; t ≤ s ≤ T
)}
is aug-
mented by all P-null sets in F ;
– uj· : Ω × [s, T ] → U
j
, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, are
{
F ts
}
s≥t
-adapted processes on(
Ω,F ,P
)
with
E
∫ T
s
|ujτ |
2dτ <∞, s ∈ [t, T ];
– For any x ∈ Rd, the FBSDEs in (9) and (15) admit a unique solution set{
X
s,x;u¬j
·
· , Y
j,s,x;u¬j
·
· , Z
j,s,x;u¬j
·
·
}n
j=1
on
(
Ω,F ,F t,P
)
and
Y
s,x;u
· (ω) =
(
Y
1,s,x;u¬1
·
· (ω), Y
2,s,x;u¬2
·
· (ω), · · · , Y
n,s,x;u¬n
·
· (ω)
)
∈ K,
P− almost ω ∈ Ω, ∀s ∈ [t, T ].
Then, with restriction to the above admissible system, we can state the risk-averse
decision problem as follows.
Problem: Find an n-tuple of optimal preferable decisions for the risk-averse agents,
i.e., uˆ· = ( uˆ1· , uˆ2· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ], with ξ
Target
j ∈ L
2(Ω,FT ,P;R), for
4 In the paper, we assume that the set on the right-hand side of (30) is nonempty.
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j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, such that
uˆj· ∈
{
arg inf Jj
[(
u¬j
)]∣∣∣uˆ· satisfies equation (30) and
u¬j· = ( uˆ
1
· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , u
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆ
n
· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1
U i[t,T ],
with restriction to Σ[0,T ]
}
. (31)
Furthermore, the accumulated risk-costs Jj , for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, over the time-
interval [0, T ] are given
Jj
[(
u¬j
)]
=
∫ T
0
cj
(
s,X
0,x;u¬j
·
s , u
j
s
)
ds+ Ψj(X
0,x;u¬j
·
T ),
X
0,x;u¬j
·
0 = x, and Ψj(X
0,x;u¬j
·
T ) = ξ
Target
j . (32)
In the following section, we establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions,
in the sense of viscosity, for the risk-averse decision problem in (31) with restriction
to Σ[0,T ].
4 Main results
In this section, we present our main results, where we introduce a framework that
requires a “rational” cooperation among the risk-averse agents so as to achieve an
overall optimal risk-averseness (in the sense of Pareto optimality). Moreover, such
a framework allows us to establish the existence of optimal risk-averse solutions,
in the sense of viscosity, to the associated risk-averse dynamic programming equa-
tions.
Proposition 1 Suppose that the generator functional g satisfies Assumption 1. Fur-
ther, let the statements in (8) along with (10) hold true. Then, for any (t, x) ∈
[0, T ]×Rd and for every u¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆj−1· , uj· , uˆj+1· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ]
and j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, restricted to Σ[t,T ], the FBSDEs in (9) and (15) admit unique
adapted solutions
X
t,x;u¬j
·
· ∈ S
2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
(
Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
· , Z
j,t,x;u¬j
·
·
)
∈ S2
(
t, T ;R
)
×H2
(
t, T ;Rd
)
, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
(33)
Moreover, the risk-values V ujj
(
t, x
)
, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, are deterministic.
Lemma 3 Let (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd and u¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , u
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆ
n
· )
∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ], for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, be restricted to Σ[t,T ]. Then, for any r ∈ [t, T ]
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and Rd-valued F tr-measurable random variable η, we have
V u
j
j
(
r, η
)
= Y
j,t,x;u¬j
·
r
, ρ
gj
r,T
[∫ T
r
cj
(
s,X
r,η;u¬j
·
s , u
j
s
)
ds+ Ψj(X
r,η;u¬j
·
T )
]
, P-a.s. (34)
Proposition 2 Let u¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , u
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆ
n
· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[0,T ], for
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, be restricted to Σ[t,T ]. Suppose that the system of semilinear
parabolic PDEs in (20) enjoys the viability property w.r.t. the closed convex set K .
Then, there exists a constant C > 0 such that d2K(·) is twice differentiable at y and〈
y −ΠK(y), G(t,x, y, zσ(t, x, u
¬j)
〉
≤
1
4
〈
D2(d2K(y))zσ(t, x, u
¬j), zσ(t, x, u¬j)
〉
+ Cd2K(y),
∀(t, x, y, z) ∈ [0, T ]× Rd × Rn × L(Rd;Rn),
∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. (35)
Suppose that Proposition 2 holds true, i.e., the system of semilinear parabolic PDEs
in (20) enjoys viability property w.r.t. the closed convex set K .5 Further, assume that
the set on the right-hand side of equation (30) is nonempty. Moreover, for t ∈ [0, T ]
and uˆ· = ( uˆ1· , uˆ2· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ], with restriction to Σ[t,T ], let u˜
¬j
· and
u¬j· , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, be two n-tuple decisions from
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ], i.e.,
u˜¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , u˜
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ]
u¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆ
j−1
· , u
j
· , uˆ
j+1
· , · · · , uˆ
n
· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ]
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}

 .
Then, we can define the following partial ordering on K by(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
u˜¬1
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
u˜¬2
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
u˜¬n
)] )
≺
(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
u¬1
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
u¬2
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
u¬n
)] )
, (36)
if ρgjt,T
[
ξjt,T
(
u˜¬j
)]
≤ ρ
gj
t,T
[
ξjt,T
(
u¬j
)]
for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n, with strict inequality
for at least one j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Furthermore, we say that(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
uˆ
)] )
∈ K (37)
is a Pareto equilibrium, in the sense of viscosity solutions, if there is no(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
u¬1
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
u¬2
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
u¬n
)] )
∈ K (38)
for which(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
uˆ
)] )
≺
(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
u¬1
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
u¬2
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
u¬n
)] )
. (39)
5 Here, we also assume that K enjoys the BSVP for the equation in (15).
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Then, with restriction to Σ[t,T ], we can characterize the optimal decisions for the
risk-averse agents as follows.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Proposition 2 holds true and let ϕ ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ] ×
R
d;Rn) satisfy (20) with ϕ(T, x) = Ψ(x) for x ∈ Rd. Then, ϕj(t, x) ≤ V ujj (t, x)
for u¬j· = ( uˆ1· , . . . , uˆj−1· , uj· , uˆj+1· , · · · , uˆn· ) ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[0,T ], for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
with restriction toΣ[t,T ], and for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd. Further, if an admissible op-
timal decision process uˆj· ∈ Uj[t,T ] exists, for almost all (s,Ω) ∈ [t, T ]×Ω, together
with the corresponding solution Xt,x;uˆ·s , and satisfies
uˆjs ∈ arg inf
u
j
·
∈U
j
[t,T ]
∣∣Σ[t,T ]
{
Lu
¬j
s ϕj
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s
)
+ gj
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s , ϕ
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s
)
, Dxϕj
(
s,X
t,x;u¬j
·
s
)
· σ
(
s,Xt,x;ws , u
¬j
s
))}
.
(40)
Then, ϕj
(
t, x
)
= V uˆ
j
j
(
t, x
) for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] ×
R
d
. Moreover, corresponding to the n-tuple of optimal risk-averse decisions uˆ· ∈⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ], there exists a Pareto equilibrium(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
uˆ
)] )
∈ K (41)
such that(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
uˆ
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
uˆ
)] )
≺
(
ρg1t,T
[
ξ1t,T
(
u¬1
)]
, ρg2t,T
[
ξ2t,T
(
u¬2
)]
, · · · , ρgnt,T
[
ξnt,T
(
u¬n
)] )
on K,
(42)
for all t ∈ [0, T ] and for {ξTargetj }nj=1 from L2(Ω,FT ,P.
5 Further remarks
In this section, we briefly comment on the problem formulation, where the risk-averse
decision framework of Section 3 – in which results from the dynamic risk analysis im-
plicitly constitute part of the information used in the context of the risk-averse criteria
– requires each of the risk-averse agents to respond optimally (in the sense of best-
response correspondence) to the decisions of the other risk-averse agents.
Note that, for example, see equations (36)–(38) for the notion of Pareto equilibrium,
and see also equation (40) for consistent optimal decisions that are all well defined
concepts in the context of risk-aversion problem in (31), with accumulated risk-costs
of (7). Here, we remark that, for every {ξTargetj }nj=1 from L2(Ω,FT ,P;R) and
for all t ∈ [0, T ], if there exists an n-tuple of optimal risk-averse decisions, i.e.,
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uˆ· ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ], such that, for any x ∈ R
d
, the FBSDEs in (9) and (15) (cf. equa-
tions (13) and (14)) admit a unique solution set {Xt,x;u¬j·· , Y j,t,x;u¬j·· , Zj,t,x;u¬j·· }nj=1
on
(
Ω,F ,F t,P
)
and
Y
s,x;u
· (ω) =
(
Y
1,s,x;u¬1
·
· (ω), Y
2,s,x;u¬2
·
· (ω), · · · , Y
n,s,x;u¬n
·
· (ω)
)
∈ K,
P− almost ω ∈ Ω, ∀s ∈ [t, T ].
Then, verifying the above condition amounted to solving the stochastic target prob-
lem, which can be specified by a set of all acceptable risk-exposures, when t = 0,
vis-a´-vis some uncertain future costs or outcomes specified by a set of random vari-
ables
{
ξTargetj
}n
j=1
from L2(Ω,FT ,P;R).
On other hand, assume that the exact information about ξTargetj ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R),
for j = 1, 2, . . . , n, are not a-priorly known, but we know that such information can
be obtained from the following allocation
L =
∑n
j=1
αjξ
Target
j ∈ L
2(Ω,FT ,P;R),
where L ∈ L2(Ω,FT ,P;R) is assumed known and
∑n
j=1 αj = 1, for some αj ≥ 0,
j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Furthermore, if there exists an n-tuple of optimal decisions, i.e.,
uˆ· ∈
⊗n
i=1 U
i
[t,T ], for the risk-averse agents, then we can define the set of optimally
allocated risk-exposures as follows
A0(L) =
{(
ρg10,T
[
ξ10,T
(
uˆ
)]
, ρg20,T
[
ξ20,T
(
uˆ
)]
, · · · , ρgn0,T
[
ξn0,T
(
uˆ
)] )
∈ K
∣∣∣
L =
∑n
j=1
αjξ
Target
j ∈ L
2(Ω,FT ,P;R) and
∑n
j=1
αj = 1,
with αj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , n
}
,
which provides further useful information to characterize all Pareto equilibria w.r.t.
the risk-averse agents.
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